Kathryn Hendley. “Legal Dualism as a Framework for Analyzing the Role of Law Under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of Law and Social Science, vol. 18, no. 1 (2022): 211-226. This article reexamines Ernst Fraenkel’s concept of the dual state, proposing the idea of legal dualism as a useful framework for understanding law under authoritarianism. Legal dualism …
Ethan Michelson. “Lawyers, Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China’s Transition From Socialism.” The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 113, no. 2 (2007): 352–414. This article examines how Chinese lawyers navigate professional challenges by developing and relying on political embeddedness, defined as their bureaucratic, instrumental, or personal ties to state actors. Drawing on data from …
Yueduan Wang. “Embedded Supervision: China’s Prosecutorial Public Interest Litigation Against Government.” Regulation & Governance, (2024): 1-41. This study challenges the assumption that diminished institutional autonomy necessarily weakens legal oversight in authoritarian regimes. Focusing on prosecutor-led public interest litigation in China, it shows that legal professionals can, under certain conditions, enhance their influence over state agencies …
Aguilar, A. (2012). Institutional changes in the public prosecutor’s office: The cases of Mexico, Chile and Brazil. Mexican law review, 4(2), 261-290. Given the critical role played by the Public Prosecutor’s Office in the criminal justice system, the reform of its powers and underlying framework is fundamental in enhancing the rule of law and democracy. …
Alex, H. (2025). Fuzzy Boundaries: A Mechanism for Group Accumulation of Advantage. Sociological Theory, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/07352751251378516 This article describes a strategic mechanism, fuzzy boundaries, that groups use to accumulate advantage. In contrast to the dominant view that rigid, well-defined boundaries maximize group rewards, I argue that ambiguity in membership criteria can, under certain conditions, more …
This article examines how immigration detention in the United States under a hardline enforcement regime, especially during the Trump administration, serves not merely as an administrative tool but as a socio-legal mechanism that fosters legal cynicism among detained noncitizens.
This study investigates how the effectiveness of legal representation in immigration removal proceedings in the United States varies based on judicial and political context.
This article examines the evolving role of U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) lawyers under the Trump administration, amid increasing concerns over democratic backsliding.
This article examines the establishment of the Independent Lawyers’ Association of Myanmar (ILAM), created through a 2014–2016 program by the International Bar Association’s Human Rights Initiative (IBAHRI).
For attorneys in backsliding democracies, this chapter offers a sobering reflection on the limits of legalism and the complex relationship between law, legitimacy, and power.