Surabhi Chopra, “Judging the Troops: Exceptional Security Measures and Judicial Impact in India.” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 44, no. 3 (2019): 555–85. Summary: This Article examines a controversial national security measure: the use of the armed forces within domestic borders. Military policing blurs the boundaries between crime and war, and tends to entail greater use …
Dave Bridge, Curt Nichols, “Congressional Attacks on the Supreme Court: A Mechanism to Maintain, Build, and Consolidate.” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 41, no. 1 (2016): 100–125. Summary: Reexamination and reinterpretation of the “mature” (1955–1984) New Deal era of congressional attacks on the Supreme Court reveals a new hypothesis: that Court‐curbing efforts played a previously unrecognized …
Maciej Kisilowski, “The Middlemen: The Legal Profession, the Rule of Law, and Authoritarian Regimes.” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 40, no. 3 (2015): 700–722. Summary: Scholars are increasingly interested in exploring ways to strengthen the rule of law in authoritarian states—especially when deeper political reforms are not attainable. The article contributes to this discussion by …
Ling Li, “The ‘Production’ of Corruption in China’s Courts: Judicial Politics and Decision Making in a One-Party State.” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 37, no. 4 (2012): 848–77. Summary: Despite its rampant presence, judicial corruption in China has often been regarded as the idiosyncratically deviant behavior of a few black sheep eluding prescribed judicial conduct. This …
Jothie Rajah. “Punishing Bodies, Securing the Nation: How Rule of Law Can Legitimate the Urbane Authoritarian State.” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 36, no. 4 (2011): 945–70. Summary: Although authoritarian rule of law may seem an oxymoron, strategic reconfigurations of the “rule of law” can produce acceptance of law that observes procedure while erasing rights. …
Shoaib A Ghias, “Miscarriage of Chief Justice: Judicial Power and the Legal Complex in Pakistan under Musharraf.” Law & Social Inquiry, vol. 35, no. 4 (2010): 985–1022. Summary: This article explores the struggle for judicial power in Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf focusing on two questions. First, how did pro‐Musharraf regime judges expand judicial power, leading …
Nora Webb Williams, Margaret Hanson, “Captured Courts and Legitimized Autocrats: Transforming Kazakhstan’s Constitutional Court.” Law & Social Inquiry vol. 47, no. 4 (2022): 1201–33. Summary: Contemporary dictators routinely co-opt institutions crucial for democratic governance. Although an extensive literature examines why and how aspiring autocrats bring elections and parties under their control, constitutions—and the judicial or quasi-judicial …
Natalie Wenzell Letsa, Yonatan L Morse, “Autocratic Legalism, Partisanship, and Popular Legitimation in Authoritarian Cameroon.” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 87, No. 4 (2023): Pages 935–955 Summary: Authoritarian regimes regularly turn to the law to justify repression. This article examines whether invoking legal institutions has a persuasive effect on public perceptions of repression, and whether that effect …
Rachel E Bowen. The Achilles Heel of Democracy: Judicial Autonomy and the Rule of Law in Central America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017. Summary: Featuring the first in-depth comparison of the judicial politics of five under-studied Central American countries, The Achilles Heel of Democracy offers a novel typology of ‘judicial regime types’ based on the political …
Rachel Ibreck, South Sudan’s Injustice System: Law and Activism on the Frontline. London: Zed Books, 2019. Summary: Coming into existence amid a wave of optimism in 2011, South Sudan has since slid into violence and conflict. Even in the face of escalating civil war, however, the people of the country continue to fight for justice, despite …