University of Wisconsin–Madison

Archive

Liebman (2011), “A Populist Threat to Chinese Courts?”

Liebman, Benjamin L. “A Populist Threat to China’s Courts?,” in Chinese Justice: Civil Dispute Resolution in Contemporary China. Edited by Margaret Y. K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher, pp. 269-313. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2011). Summary: Is the Chinese party-state too responsive to public opinion? In the case of the courts, this may be the …

Federal Judges Block Trump’s Executive Orders Targeting Law Firms

In a major legal rebuke, a fourth federal judge has struck down a Trump executive order targeting the elite law firm Susman Godfrey. The ruling, issued by U.S. District Judge Loren AliKhan, deemed the order “unconstitutional from beginning to end,” echoing prior decisions that permanently blocked similar actions against Perkins Coie, Jenner & Block, and …

Huneeus, Couso, Sieder (2010), “Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Contemporary Latin America.”

Alexandra Huneeus, Javier Couso, and Rachel Sieder. “Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Contemporary Latin America,” In Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Latin America. Edited by Javier Couso, Alexandra Huneeus, and Rachel Sieder, pp. 3–22. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Summary: Legal practices and ideas about law are undergoing dramatic change …

Fu (2016), “Building Judicial Integrity in China.”

Hualing Fu, “Building Judicial Integrity in China.” Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev, vol. 39, no. 1 (2016): 167-181. Summary: Since the late 1970s, the Chinese judiciary has undergone a continuous reform process of professionalization and institutionalization. Despite the political constraints, there are sufficient opportunities and incentives to continue China’s judicial reform so as to enhance …

Hilbink (2007), “Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile,”

Lisa Hilbink, Judges beyond Politics in Democracy and Dictatorship: Lessons from Chile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Summary: Why did formerly independent Chilean judges, trained under and appointed by democratic governments, facilitate and condone the illiberal, antidemocratic, and anti-legal policies of the Pinochet regime? Challenging the assumption that adjudication in non-democratic settings is fundamentally different and …

Graver (2014), Judges Against Justice: On Judges When the Rule of Law is Under Attack.

Hans Petter Graver, Judges Against Justice: On Judges When the Rule of Law is Under Attack. New York City: Springer, 2014.  Summary: This book explores concrete situations in which judges are faced with a legislature and an executive that consciously and systematically discard the ideals of the rule of law. It revolves around three basic questions: …

Ginsburg (2008), “Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian Regimes.”

Tom Ginsburg. “Administrative Law and the Judicial Control of Agents in Authoritarian Regimes,” in The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes. Edited by Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, pp. 58-72. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Summary: One reason that dictators empower courts is to monitor and discipline lower-level administrative agents. This chapter applies a version of …

Cheesman (2011), “How an Authoritarian Regime in Burma Used Special Courts to Defeat Judicial Independence,”

Nick Cheesman, “How an Authoritarian Regime in Burma Used Special Courts to Defeat Judicial Independence.” Law & Society Review, vol. 45, no. 4 (2011): 801–30.  Summary: Why do authoritarian rulers establish special courts? One view is that they do so to insulate the judiciary from politically oriented cases and allow it continued, albeit limited, independence. …

Bowen (2013), “Judicial Autonomy in Central America: A Typological Approach,”

Rachel E Bowen, “Judicial Autonomy in Central America: A Typological Approach.” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 66, no. 4 (2013): 831–42.  Summary: Judicial autonomy from societal actors is argued herein to be a critical aspect of the rule of law and to have been overlooked by the dominance within comparative judicial politics of the role of interbranch …

Basabe-Serrano (2015), “Informal Institutions and Judicial Independence in Paraguay, 1954-2011”

Santiago Basabe-Serrano, “Informal Institutions and Judicial Independence in Paraguay, 1954-2011.” Law & Policy, vol. 37, no. 4 (2015): 350-378. Summary: This article explains how informal institutions have prevented the emergence of autonomous judges in Paraguay between 1954 and 2011. The central argument is that co-optation, clientelism, and judicial corruption considered as informal institutions, rooted during the …