Gerzso, Thalia. Judicial resistance during electoral disputes: Evidence from Kenya (2023). Electoral Studies, 85, 102653.
Over the last decade, African courts have become central actors in the conduct of elections, sometimes even resisting incumbents during electoral disputes. This article asks when and why courts in hybrid regimes take the risk of siding with the opposition despite intense pressure from the executive. Drawing on original qualitative and quantitative data from Kenya—including 224 hand-coded electoral disputes and 24 elite interviews—the paper argues that judicial resistance emerges only when institutional reforms both strengthen de jure judicial independence and mobilize judicial support networks. Kenya’s 2010 constitution is presented as a pivotal reform that restructured appointments, discipline, budgeting, and court hierarchy while also enabling lawyers, civil society, and judicial actors to professionalize and strategically litigate electoral issues. Gerzso demonstrates that increased litigation, training, and monitoring by these networks built courts’ expertise and shifted the political costs of colluding with incumbents. The result was a marked increase in pro-opposition rulings, culminating in the historic 2017 annulment of President Kenyatta’s election. The article highlights how, even in hybrid regimes, institutional design and support networks can create conditions for courts to resist executive pressure and uphold electoral integrity.