Nick Cheesman, “How an Authoritarian Regime in Burma Used Special Courts to Defeat Judicial Independence.” Law & Society Review, vol. 45, no. 4 (2011): 801–30. Summary: Why do authoritarian rulers establish special courts? One view is that they do so to insulate the judiciary from politically oriented cases and allow it continued, albeit limited, independence. …
Santiago Basabe-Serrano, “Informal Institutions and Judicial Independence in Paraguay, 1954-2011.” Law & Policy, vol. 37, no. 4 (2015): 350-378. Summary: This article explains how informal institutions have prevented the emergence of autonomous judges in Paraguay between 1954 and 2011. The central argument is that co-optation, clientelism, and judicial corruption considered as informal institutions, rooted during the …
Abouharb, M. Rodwan, Laura P. Moyer, and Megan Schmidt, “De Facto Judicial Independence and Physical Integrity Rights.” Journal of Human Rights, vol. 12, no. 4 (2013): 367–96. Summary: Economists, political scientists, and legal scholars have argued that independent judiciaries have an important role to play in promoting economic development and protecting property rights. Abouharb, Moyer, and …
Peter H Solomon, “Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes.” World Politics, vol. 60, no. 1 (2007): 122–45. Summary: Typically, authoritarian leaders treat law and courts in an instrumental fashion and try to keep judges dependent and responsive to their desires. Various works reveal the sophisticated ways that this is achieved, including the development of judicial bureaucracies …
Gretchen Helmke, “Public Support and Judicial Crises in Latin America.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 13, no. 2 (2010): 397-411 Summary: How do courts establish their power? What conditions undermine it? The answer hinges on how aligned judges are with public opinion. Drawing on the history of the United States Supreme Court, …