University of Wisconsin–Madison

Archive

Alex (2025). “Fuzzy Boundaries: A Mechanism for Group Accumulation of Advantage”

Alex, H. (2025). Fuzzy Boundaries: A Mechanism for Group Accumulation of Advantage. Sociological Theory, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/07352751251378516 This article describes a strategic mechanism, fuzzy boundaries, that groups use to accumulate advantage. In contrast to the dominant view that rigid, well-defined boundaries maximize group rewards, I argue that ambiguity in membership criteria can, under certain conditions, more …

Legal Ethics Roundup: Judges Critique Lawyer Lies, CA Won’t Expunge Discipline, AG Attacks On ESG As Ethics Violations, AI Keeps Hallucinating Legal Opinions & More

This week’s Legal Ethics Roundup highlights pressing issues at the intersection of law, ethics, and democracy. Former federal judges warn that DOJ lawyers under the Trump administration have misled courts, raising new questions about government accountability. Other major stories include the California Supreme Court’s refusal to erase attorney discipline records, state attorneys general potentially violating …

Trump’s Attempt to Roll Back Key Civil Rights-Enforcement Tool

The ACLU is leading the fight to protect civil rights and challenge systemic inequality in housing, employment, education, and beyond. Recent actions by the Trump administration threaten decades of progress by rolling back disparate impact protections — a key tool that holds institutions accountable for policies that disproportionately harm marginalized communities, even without explicit intent …

Chad: Constitutional Change Threatens Rule of Law and Democracy

Chad’s recent constitutional amendment abolishing presidential term limits marks a major setback for democracy and the rule of law. The reform, fast-tracked through parliament and signed by President Mahamat Idriss Déby, allows him to remain in power indefinitely and extends presidential terms from five to seven years. Human Rights Watch warns that this move dismantles …

Defending Our Ideals in the Face of Adversity

In a powerful reflection, Suren Avanesyan shares his encounter with two leading Russian human rights lawyers, Vadim Prokhorov and Karina Moskalenko, who continue to defend political prisoners from exile. Their work before the European Court of Human Rights is one of the few remaining avenues for justice as political repression in Russia intensifies. The piece …

Satterthwaite, Sydow & Polk (2023). “Unchecking Power and Capturing Courts: How Autocratization Erodes Independent Judicial Systems”.

Satterthwaite, M. L., Sydow, K., & Polk, B. (2023). Unchecking Power and Capturing Courts: How Autocratization Erodes Independent Judicial Systems. Rutgers UL Rev., 76, 1147. The paper argues that courts have increasingly taken on legislative functions by issuing structural reform injunctions—broad, ongoing orders designed to overhaul public institutions such as prisons, schools, and mental hospitals. …

Mather & Levin (2022). “When and Why Do Lawyer Organizations Seek to Influence Law?”

Mather, Lynn and Levin, Leslie C., When and Why Do Lawyer Organizations Seek to Influence Law? (2022). Lawyers in 21st Century Societies: Volume 2 (2022), University at Buffalo School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2022-007, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4213604 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4213604 Lawyers seek to influence law through advocacy for individual clients, but also through collective efforts. …

Khalil (2024). “This Country has Laws”: Legalism as a Tool of Entrenching Autocracy in Egypt.

Khalil, H. M. (2024). “This Country has Laws”: Legalism as a Tool of Entrenching Autocracy in Egypt. American Behavioral Scientist, 68(12), 1597-1615. https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642241267936 (Original work published 2024)  This article investigates the role of legalism and legal processes in entrenching autocratic rule in post-revolution Egypt. In the aftermath of the spectacular street protests that swept Egypt, …

Trochev (2024). “Pliant Courts, Recalcitrant Chiefs and Judicial Clientelism in Authoritarian Regimes”.

Trochev, Alexei, ‘Pliant Courts, Recalcitrant Chiefs and Judicial Clientelism in Authoritarian Regimes’, in Björn Dressel, Raul Sanchez-Urribarri, and Alexander Stroh-Steckelberg (eds), Informality and Courts: Comparative Perspectives (Edinburgh, 2024; online edn, Edinburgh Scholarship Online, 18 Sept. 2025), https://doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781399535250.003.0005, accessed 6 Oct. 2025. How and why do some autocracies have pliant courts yet recalcitrant judicial chiefs? Trochev argue that is an unexpected consequence of empowering the …