Taraleigh Davis, “The ‘Case’ for Independent Courts: The Insurance Theory of Judicialization in Autocracies.” Journal of Law and Courts, vol. 13, no. 1 (2025): 35–50.
Summary: Why would authoritarian rulers allow for an independent judiciary that could constrain their power? This study extends the insurance theory of judicial independence to autocratic contexts, arguing that when leaders perceive a higher risk of losing office, they become more likely to tolerate or create independent courts as a safeguard against potential post-exit reprisals. Using a novel two-stage analytical approach, Davis constructs a hazard rate for each country year from the Geddes et al. (2014) autocratic regime dataset, based on factors directly observable to autocratic leaders. This hazard rate serves as a proxy for perceived risk of losing power. Davis’ findings provide robust evidence that higher perceived risk is significantly associated with greater judicial independence in autocratic regimes, even when controlling for economic development, regime longevity, and court age.