Wei Cui. “Does Judicial Independence Matter: A Study of the Determinants of Administrative Litigation in an Authoritarian Regime.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, vol. 38, no. 3 (2016): 941-998.
This article examines administrative litigation against the government in authoritarian regimes, using over twenty years of data from China’s tax collection cases. While lawsuits against the government are a normal part of governance in democracies, administrative litigation is often seen as a key tool for promoting the rule of law and protecting individual rights in authoritarian settings. The judiciary is expected to constrain government power through judicial review, with judicial competence considered critical. However, this article challenges that view by showing that factors like litigant behavior and the regulatory environment explain litigation patterns better than judicial quality. The study argues that judicial review depends fundamentally on private parties choosing to sue, and in weak legal systems, even a competent judiciary cannot ensure the rule of law if plaintiffs do not engage.