Edward L. Rubin. “The Varieties Of Judicial Independence And The Judiciary’s Role In Political Reform.” In The Legal Process and the Promise of Justice: Studies Inspired by the Work of Malcolm Feeley. Edited by Rosann Greenspan, Hadar Aviram, and Jonathan Simon, pp. 335-360. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2019.

This chapter highlights the crucial role of attorneys in backsliding democracies by examining the liberal legal complex, particularly the relationship between judges and lawyers. Feeley and colleagues demonstrate that these interactions are central to constraining government power and protecting basic human rights. Judicial independence is presented not as an abstract quality but as a relational and context-dependent feature that lawyers help maintain or negotiate. In settings where democratic institutions are eroding, the quality of lawyer-judge interactions becomes a key mechanism through which legal professionals can resist authoritarian encroachments, uphold procedural norms, and safeguard civil liberties. By understanding how judicial independence varies across contexts, attorneys can better navigate politically hostile environments to sustain legal checks on the state and preserve the space for political liberalism, even under pressure.