Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth. “State Politics and Legal Markets.” Comparative Sociology, vol. 10, no. 1 (2011): 38-66.
This article critiques dominant literature on the legal profession for overlooking deeper structural and sociological questions, particularly those concerning the role of elite lawyers in shaping state and economic power. Rather than focusing narrowly on the legal profession as a formal category, the authors adopt a Bourdieusian framework that examines the broader social space in which legal professionals operate. Central to their analysis is the idea that law and lawyers are embedded with social interests, and that legal professionals themselves pursue specific, often elite, interests. The goal is not to offer a moral assessment of lawyers, but to understand how they contribute to the construction and maintenance of state authority and economic systems. By analyzing the interplay between knowledge, state politics, and social or economic power, the article illuminates how elite lawyers function as key actors in reinforcing dominant institutions and hierarchies.