Michelson, E., & Li, K. (2012, May). Judicial performance without independence: the delivery of justice and political legitimacy in rural China. In Prepared for workshop on works-in-progress on Chinese law.
The debate over whether weak judicial independence undermines judicial performance and regime legitimacy in authoritarian contexts remains unresolved. Using survey data from 23 Chinese villages in 2002 and 2010, the study finds that judicial performance improved despite limited independence, and that such performance bolstered regime legitimacy. Positive (or negative) experiences with village governments and courts shaped citizens’ evaluations of governance, with legal experiences having the strongest effects. These effects included not only direct assessments of local institutions but also “spillover” effects—improving or diminishing trust in higher levels of government. Importantly, positive legal experiences grew over time and generated both upward and downward legitimacy spillover, influencing broader perceptions of political governance more than any other type of help-seeking experience. The findings suggest that under certain conditions, weak judicial independence can paradoxically strengthen authoritarian legitimacy, as the fusion of law and bureaucracy may reinforce rather than weaken political authority.