Gábor Halmai and Ágnes Kovács. “The Hungarian Constitutional Court: From a Target to an Agent of Autocratization.” (2025) https://acrobat.adobe.com/id/urn:aaid:sc:EU:6acfc595-d256-4b02-a7e8-c92f12888726?viewer%21megaVerb=group-discover

The article examines the impact of autocratization on the resilience of the Hungarian Constitutional Court following the Fidesz government’s substantial alterations to the institutional design of constitutional review. The analysis of the captured Court’s jurisprudence explores various judicial strategies that serve the interests of the autocratic regime. It reveals how abusive constitutional review has evolved in both scale and degree, resulting in the Court’s active role in dismantling the remaining channels of constitutional resilience, while simultaneously contributing to the facade of legalistic legitimacy. The article argues that the institution, once internationally renowned, became a reliable partner of the autocratic government.