Hilbink argues that positive judicial independence—which she defines as judges’ willingness to assert legal authority against powerful actors—cannot be explained solely by political fragmentation or formal institutional arrangements. Drawing on comparative evidence and detailed case studies of Spain and Chile, she shows that judges often behave contrary to what strategic models predict: some assert themselves even under authoritarian rule, while others remain passive despite competitive politics. Hilbink contends that the key driver of positive independence is judicial role conceptions shaped through social, educational, and institutional processes. In Spain, a new cohort of judges embraced an activist, rights-protecting professional ideology during the late Franco era and engaged in high-risk legal challenges. In Chile, by contrast, a deeply rooted ideology of judicial restraint persisted well into democracy, delaying the emergence of assertive judicial behavior until new legal theories, training reforms, and a generational shift took hold. Ultimately, Hilbink shows that ideational change—not structural incentives—is necessary for judges to “speak law to power.”