Tamir Moustafa, “Law versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics in Egypt.” Law & Social Inquiry 28, no. 4 (2003): 883–930.
Summary: Why would an authoritarian regime empower a constitutional court? Moustafa explains Egypt’s paradox by arguing that the regime created an independent Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) chiefly to make credible commitments to protect property rights and attract investment after state-led development faltered. Once established with unusual institutional autonomy, the SCC expanded its authority and—through a synergy with opposition parties, legal professional associations, and emergent human rights NGOs—opened avenues to challenge state power, striking down illiberal laws (including on elections and press freedoms) and reshaping state–society relations. Yet its activism was strategically bounded: the SCC upheld emergency state security courts and avoided confronting military trials of civilians, enabling what Moustafa terms “insulated liberalism,” wherein selective rights expansion coexisted with the regime’s core tools of control. Over time, as SCC rulings constrained the executive, authorities moved—via legal and extralegal means—to curb this court–civil society partnership. The case shows how judicialization can emerge and matter in nondemocracies, driven by economic imperatives and institutional design, while remaining limited by red lines of regime security.